By Sitara Noor
The Hiroshima Declaration at the end of a two-day
meeting of the foreign ministers of the G7 states earlier this month committed
to seek “a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons in a way that promotes international stability”. The statement
used many euphemisms to justify states’ security compulsions and, as expected,
fell short of guaranteeing a world without nuclear weapons. This, once again,
highlights the incessant struggle between the normative approach to the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and the politics of national security. This is
largely because norms, as a form of behaviour, fall into an idealistic
paradigm, while national security is based on realpolitik considerations, thus
creating a dichotomy for the decision-maker. This contradiction is even more
visible in the domain of nuclear norms, both existing and developing ones.
The non-use of nuclear weapons, or the so-called ‘nuclear
taboo’, has emerged as a longstanding nuclear norm over the years. The horrific
impact of nuclear bombs dropped on the Japanese cities, killing thousands of
people in an instant, was indeed sufficient reason to initiate a counter
thought. It is, however, interesting to note that the non-use of nuclear
weapons emerged as a norm only after the Soviet Union had equalised the balance
of power and the potential use of nuclear weapons lost its policy value due to
the threat of massive retaliation. This established norm managed to give rise
to a universal abhorrence towards the idea of nuclear use, but it has not been
strong enough to compel any concrete measure towards complete nuclear
disarmament, primarily because it has not served the national interests of the
weapons-possessing states. It, however, gave rise to subsidiary arrangements,
such as non-proliferation, which was later codified into a formal Treaty of
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, which included an article with a categorical
commitment to nuclear disarmament. Despite the failure of nuclear disarmament
to develop as a practiced norm due to the possessing states’ national security
concerns, non-proliferation has emerged as a new normative approach. The norm
of non-proliferation achieved momentum and successfully managed to constrain
the number of weapons-possessing states and reach near universality.
Nevertheless, one major challenge to non-proliferation is the selective
approach taken by leading states to incorporate so-called ‘outlier states’,
without a criteria in the non-proliferation regime. It is, therefore,
imperative that efforts should be made to strengthen existing nuclear norms and
to avoid making country-specific concessions with detrimental effects on the
non-proliferation regime.
With the commencement of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process in 2010,
nuclear security had the potential to emerge as a new norm. Notwithstanding the
criticism on its exclusive nature, the NSS process has created the opportunity
for the adoption of a normative approach towards nuclear security. Nuclear
security challenges pose a threat to global security, but this is an area where
states are reluctant to enter into legally binding commitments. But the NSS
process has laid the groundwork for recognition of the threat and has
encouraged states to take voluntary action that, in turn, will ensure global
security. As a direct result of commitments made at the last three sessions of
the NSS, 12 countries have eliminated high enriched uranium (HEU), or separated
plutonium from their territories. Twenty-seven states have removed
approximately 3,000 kilogrammes of HEU and separated plutonium. Fourteen
countries have opted for using low-enriched uranium in 24 reactors. While many
may argue that the NSS process outcomes did not match the hype created around
it, it remains a fact that the successful legacy of the NSS process has been
the recognition of the challenge and adoption of nuclear security as a desired
form of behaviour by the states. This is also manifested in the entry into
force of the amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material and Facilities.
In the nuclear domain, one major challenge remains:
emerging threats are outpacing the counter measures adopted by the states.
While it takes longer to establish and agree on legally binding commitments to
control nuclear behaviour, the establishment of new nuclear norms and
consolidating existing ones may serve as a temporary substitute to deal with
the emerging challenges.
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