Book Review “Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment”

By: Sarah Khan

A study titled ‘Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program’, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI) and co-authored by four nuclear scholars, Adeela Azam, Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Ali and Sameer Khan unveils a new and comprehensive assessment of the Indian nuclear weapon capacity. The study was launched at the ISSI, which was attended by foreign diplomats, scholars, journalists and students.

The book is comprised of four chapters. The first chapter gives detailed account of India’s domestically sufficient uranium available to meet its long term needs. Introduction of new technologies for uranium exploration and installation of new milling facilities will further enhance country’s ability to efficiently mine locally available uranium. Optimal utilization of domestic uranium reserves will allow India to keep its existing and few upcoming reactors operational for more than a century. In second chapter the writer has stated that India’s unsafeguarded uranium enrichment capacity will grow significantly by 2017. The Highly Enriched Uranium produced at Rattehali plant will be in excess to the projected requirement of fuelling the entire fleet of Indian nuclear powered submarine. The growth rate of the Indian enrichment capacity indicates that India has the fastest growing unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program in the developing world has surpassed Pakistan. The book reveals that India already has sufficient material and technical capacity to make 356 to 492 nuclear bombs.

Chapter three explores the historical role of key individuals, major powers and technology as the main internal and external drivers which helped India develop its unsafeguarded nuclear reactor program. The research also explains how and what has driven the unsafeguarded Indian nuclear reactor program while also offering a new, original and comprehensive assessment of the Indian nuclear bomb making capacity. Fourth chapter has evaluated the Indian reprocessing program. The military aspect of Indian reprocessing program is often ignored. Despite the fact that several states continue to reprocess spent nuclear fuel for civilian purposes not only its economic feasibility is questionable but its ability to significantly reduce environmental hazards is also uncertain. Almost all Indian reprocessing facilities remain outside the IAEA safeguards and are ostensibly a potential source of vertical proliferation and military use. This work is in contrast to several earlier studies which took a much modest view of the Indian nuclear bomb making potential.

The book gives a fresh perspective on India’s unsafeguarded nuclear and makes a significant addition to the existing knowledge about the size, history and capacity of the Indian unsafeguarded nuclear program. This book has used government documents, speeches, and parliamentary debates, research of leading Indian and international nuclear experts and international assessments related to the Indian nuclear program, dating back to the several past decades.

The book recommended that the member States of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should consider the large and swiftly expanding Indian nuclear bomb making capacity while dealing with New Delhi’s NSG membership case and ensure that the Indian membership of this export control arrangement does not, in any way, help India further expand and accelerate its nuclear weapons program.

The study provides deep insight into the true history, size, extent and capabilities of the different aspects of the complex Indian nuclear program, which New Delhi has kept outside the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It includes compelling evidence that India has the largest and oldest unsafeguarded nuclear program in the entire developing world and amongst States not party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).