By MUNIR AKRAM
The writer is a former
Pakistan ambassador to the UN. THE
recent India-Iran-Afghanistan agreement to develop a trade route from Chabahar
to Central Asia has been portrayed by Indian commentators as having changed the
historical ‘Great Game’ for control of the connection between South and Central
Asia through Afghanistan. It has been claimed that the agreement will end
India’s ‘isolation’ from Central Asia and Pakistan’s ‘stranglehold’ over
Afghanistan and create a ‘new security paradigm’ and a ‘geopolitical shift’.
But the Great Game has
already changed. It is being played on a wider canvas with different players
and rules. The power contest in Asia is now mainly between China and America,
and, to a lesser extent, between America and Russia — with India, Pakistan,
Iran and others in subsidiary roles. In this context, the strategic and
economic implications of the tripartite agreement are likely to be limited.
Read: US lawmakers question Indian plans for Iran's
Chabahar port
Chabahar port has been
on the drawing board for many years. Its main purpose was and will remain to
expand Iran’s oil and other trade including with India.
Implementation of the
trade route to Central Asia will remain challenging until peace can be restored
in Afghanistan. With the collapse of the inter-Afghan negotiations, Afghanistan
is likely to witness a further escalation of conflict and chaos. Transit to
Central Asia via Iran, or Pakistan, is not viable at present.
Even once the route is
operational, its economic significance will remain modest. India’s oil needs
can be met by Iran (and Saudi Arabia). The Central Asians do not have pipelines
to Chabahar; they do to China. New gas pipelines are being constructed to
Europe. Their mineral resources are also flowing north, east and west; not
south.
America is and will remain a major player in the new Asian Great
Game.
With a population of
only around 50 million, Central Asia will not become a huge market for
manufactured goods. It will be twice as expensive for India to send goods to
Central Asia through Chabahar than it would be overland across Pakistan. Indian
goods are thus unlikely to be competitive against Chinese products shipped
overland.
Also read: Lessons
from Chabahar
The strategic
advantages for India are also questionable. Its influence in Afghanistan will
be more dependent on Iran. Pakistan’s cooperation will continue to be essential
to restoring peace in Afghanistan. Indian shipping lanes to Chabahar will be
vulnerable to disruption. India’s limited influence in Central Asia will not
dent that of Russia and China.
The new Great Game
will increasingly revolve around China’s One Belt, One Road vision of land and
sea connections between Asia, Europe and beyond. The China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) is the first component of this ambitious project.
In comparison to the
Chabahar route, the strategic and economic implications of CPEC are enormous.
It will transform China from a one- to a two-ocean power; enable a part of its
$4000 billion annual trade to circumvent the Malacca straits and other
potential choke points in the Indian Ocean and shorten China’s supply lines to
the Gulf, West Asia and Africa. For these reasons, if no other, China has a
vital stake in Pakistan’s strategic stability and socioeconomic development.
The Chinese commitment of $46bn for CPEC projects is but the first instalment
of the massive capital which China is prepared to deploy in Pakistan.
Instead of being
distracted by the moves of its adversaries, Pakistan must remain focused on the
implementation of CPEC. This strategic enterprise should not be allowed to be
stalled or delayed by external pressure or internal politics, inefficiency or
corruption. It would be wise to create a separate and independent CPEC
Authority which can be a ‘one-stop-shop’ entrusted with achieving CPEC’s
enormous potential for Pakistan’s development. CPEC projects must go beyond
infrastructure development to encompass manufacture, consumer goods, housing,
health, textiles, finance and other sectors. To this end, the interaction between
Pakistani and Chinese private- and public-sector companies must be actively
expanded and intensified. Some of the externally imposed limitations on CPEC
investment projects, such as restrictions on ‘sovereign guarantees’ for debt
finance, need to be removed expeditiously.
CPEC faces threats
from Pakistan and China’s adversaries. These will have to be met forcefully.
India’s opposition has
been announced openly. New Delhi will continue to utilise Afghanistan as a base
to destabilise Pakistan and undermine CPEC. The recent spate of attacks on
Chinese workers in Pakistan is no accident. Pakistan will have to further
enhance security for them and consider direct action to remove the Afghan-based
threat from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan.
Iran has assured that
Chabahar is not designed to compete with Gwadar or CPEC. Pakistan and Iran can
cooperate for mutual benefit: to end terrorism in Balochistan, expand trade,
and construct the Iranian gas pipeline and a Gwadar-Chabahar economic corridor.
However, Tehran often wants to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. Some
recent events have sent disturbing signals which Pakistan cannot ignore.
To balance the growing
Indo-Iranian relationship, Pakistan must maintain and reinforce its
relationship with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It would be in Pakistan’s interest
to help in giving substance and form to the ‘Islamic coalition’ hastily formed
by Riyadh. It should also convince the GCC states of the benefits of CPEC as a
path to their closer connection with China.
America is and will
remain a major player in the new Asian Great Game. To bolster its strategic
contest with China, the US is moving towards a military alliance with India.
The Obama administration is also cooperating tactically with Iran in the fight
against the militant Islamic State group in Iraq and, less clearly, in Syria.
It wants Iran to help in stabilising Afghanistan. But the US-Iran relationship
could again become hostile if new sanctions are imposed by the US Congress or
differences arise over Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah or Israel.
For Islamabad, the
major threat now is possible hostile US action to destabilise Pakistan and
disrupt CPEC. Wisely, China has invited US participation in CPEC. The US has
declared, perhaps diplomatically, that it is not opposed to CPEC. But the
signals from Washington, as it hosts India’s Modi, are ominous. The new Great
Game is about to get tougher and rougher.
The writer is a former
Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn,
June 12th, 2016
No comments:
Post a Comment